The standard yardstick for cross-country comparisons of labor market performance is the unemployment rate, measured as the unemployed share of the labor force (the employed plus the unemployed) and harmonized for international comparability. The preoccupation with unemployment reflects concerns about the consequences for worker well-being. Poorly performing labor markets generate inadequate job opportunities and the price is unemployment, which harms workers, their families and their communities.
2 At least since the early 1990s, low unemployment rates have made the U.S. the model for labor market performance. After a decade of declining unemployment, the U.S. rate hit 4.0 percent in 2000, less than half of the rate for Europe of 8.4%. In 2006, this 4.4 point gap was nearly identical (4.6% and 8.9%, respectively), and the difference between the U.S. and France was even larger (4.6% and 9.2%) (OECD 2007a, Statistical Annex) .
The conventional view is that this strong U.S. performance on the unemployment rate reflects the advantages of flexible, relatively de-regulated labor markets in which work incentives are not undermined by overly generous unemployment-related social benefits (OECD, 1999; IMF, 2003; Nickell et al., 2005) . 3 As The Economist (2005, Nov. 12, p. 11) has proclaimed, "Over the last decade the British and American economies have generated impressive growth and plenty of new jobs; the French economy has failed on both counts.
Why? The main answer is that the French labour market is throttled by restrictions such as the 35-hour week, a high minimum wage, and tough hiring and firing rules." According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2005, p. 30) , "The negative influence of the tax and benefit system on labour market incentives and the interaction of these effects with the minimum wage and other labour market institutions are at the origin of a significant part of structural unemployment and low participation in France."
But even by the narrow yardstick of the unemployment rate, the employment performance story is not quite so unambiguous. With much the same regulatory and welfare state apparatus, France showed far superior performance to the U.S. throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Howell, 2005 , Figure 1 .1, p. 10). Indeed, it was not until 1984 that the U.S. rate fell below France's. In addition, the current economic crisis has demonstrated the benefits of the 2 The unemployment rate is also used as an indicator of labor market efficiency (the effective use of available labor resources) and overall economic performance (capacity utilization). 3 For perspectives on the literature on institutions and the cross-country pattern of unemployment, see Howell, 2005a; Blanchard, 2006; "European Model" during economic downturns: U.S. and European unemployment rates have converged, and as of May 2009, France actually had a lower rate (9.3% compared to 9.4% for the U.S.). 4 But more importantly for the purposes of this paper, the unemployment rate alone is a poor indicator of national labor market performance. To the extent that labor markets are judged on their ability to provide satisfactory levels of worker well-being through employment, performance must be judged, not just on the adequacy of the number of jobs, but on wages per hour and hours of work as well. For a given unemployment rate, labor market performance should be judged superior if it generates a lower incidence of jobs paying very low wages (e.g., less than 2/3 of the median wage) and/or generates a mix of jobs that better matches workers' desired hours of work (e.g., a lower rate of involuntary part-time employment).
We compare French and U.S. employment performance with newly developed indicators of employment adequacy (Howell, 2005b; Howell and Diallo, 2007) . These are designed to reflect three dimensions of employment performance: the adequacy of the number of jobs (like the conventional unemployment and employment rates), the adequacy of work hours (measured by the rate involuntary part-time work), and the adequacy of wages (measured by the incidence of low hourly pay). Like standard government-produced indicators, our two main indicators are measured with reference to two different populations, the labor force and the working age population: the under-employment rate (UER: the unemployed, involuntarily parttime, and very low-paid share of the labor force); and the adequate employment rate (AER: the employed who are not paid low wages and who are not working involuntarily part-time as a share of the working age population). Since it is a key underlying component of the UER and AER, we also present results for the low-wage share of employment (LWS).
It might be argued that since these composite indicators measure very different dimensions of work (job availability, low wages, hours of work) and each has quite different welfare consequences for workers, they should either not be aggregated, or they should at least be weighted differently. Concerning aggregation, there is considerable interest in cross-country performance comparisons, and if the adequacy of both the quantity and quality of jobs is to be Concerning weighting, it is true that unemployment, involuntary part-time work, and low-wage work should not be assumed to be equally "bad" outcomes. While it would be easy to provide a variety of AERs and UERs with alternative weights, we do not do so for several reasons. First, there is no obvious way to assign weights, or even to identify which condition is the worst (e.g., a continuous long-term low wage job might be viewed as worse than a shortterm unemployment spell). Second, and more importantly, our goal is not to measure welfare, but to provide simple indicators of performance that provide counts of the number of workers for whom the labor market has produced inadequate outcomes. This is in fact exactly like the official unemployment rate, which does not distinguish between the seriousness of the unemployment spell (e.g., long-term vs short-term unemployment; or the unemployment of a young person versus that of a prime-age worker with children; or to be unemployed with and without unemployment benefits, etc.).
The paper is organized in five sections. Section 1 provides an overview of the conventional "quantity-of-employment" indicators and what they suggest about the relative employment performance of the U.S. and France in recent decades. Section 2 surveys recent efforts to account for labor underutilization and job quality. Section 3 outlines the construction of our employment adequacy indicators. These indicators are then used in Section 4 to compare French and U.S. employment performance for 1993-2005. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Comparisons Using Conventional Quantity-of-Employment Indicators

Quantity-of-Employment Indicators
Statistical agencies in all developed countries produce labor market indicators that break the working age population into three distinct, non-overlapping categories: the unemployed, the employed, and those "out-of-the-labor-force." The unemployed are "persons over a certain specified age who are without work, available for work and actively seeking work" (Sorrentino, 2000, p. 4) , and the conventionally defined rate of unemployment is the unemployed share of the labor force (the employed plus the unemployed). 5 The "employed"
are those who work for pay for at least an hour in the reference week, and the employment rate is calculated as the employed share of the working age population. Working age individuals neither unemployed nor employed are allocated to the "out-of-the-labor-force" category.
6
Since the standard unemployment rate is measured against the labor force, it reflects not just the incidence of unemployment, but also the extent of paid employment. 7 Thus, two countries with the same working age population and the same number of unemployed will have unemployment rates that vary inversely with the number of employed workers. That is, all else equal, more employment (e.g., students working part-time) means a lower unemployment rate even if the number of unemployed remains the same. As we show below, replacing this conventional unemployment rate with the unemployment-to-population rate produces a very different picture of the relative magnitudes of French and U.S. youth unemployment.
In terms of generating reliable data that can be compared across national boundaries, an advantage of the employment rate is that it does not require determining who is really available and seriously searching for work, which adds considerable "statistical noise" in cross-country comparisons of unemployment even when these rates have been "harmonized" (Sorrentino, 2000) . Unlike the unemployment rate, higher employment rates are not necessarily "better", at least if worker well-being is the criterion. For example, the shift from full-time "living wage" jobs to part-time marginal ones may require more workers per household than desired. This is particularly so for young persons, parents of school age children, and older persons, for whom full-time enrollment in school, full-time child care, and retirement while still able to work may be the socially preferred outcomes.
French and U.S. Performance Using Conventional Indicators 8
5 Over the last several decades the definitions of these categories across countries have converged. Because of differences across countries in the treatment of "availability" for work, what qualifies as "active search," and how various groups in the population are treated (students, unpaid family members, members of the armed forces, and so on), a great deal of effort has been devoted to standardizing (or "harmonizing") the unemployment rate, principally by the BLS, the OECD, the ILO and Eurostat (see Sorrentino, 2000, appendix) . 6 Jones and Riddell (1999) argue that this tripartite categorization is inadequate, because of the "heterogeneity of the nonemployed…any attempt to dichotomize the nonemployed into "unemployment" and "out-of-the-labor force" is unlikely to full capture the complexity of labor force activity." 7 UR=U/LF, where LF=U+E, U is the number of unemployed, and E is the number of employed workers. 8 For reasons of space and manageability, we limit our attention to youth (16-24) and prime age (25-54) workers. Differences in norms regarding the desirability of work at ages over 59 complicates comparisons of the The poor performance of the French labor market compared to the U.S. is based on unemployment rates over the period of 1984-2007 and the conventional wisdom is that at the root of this poor performance are labor market rigidities generated by too much labor market regulation and too much unemployment-related benefit generosity. Figure 1 presents what appears to be long run divergence (using log trend lines), with the French rate rising and the U.S. rate declining. But it was not until 1984 that the U.S. reported a lower harmonized unemployment rate than France and over the course of the last two years (not shown) French and U.S. rates have converged (to 9.3-9.4% in April 2009).
Employment rates by age group further challenge the conventional account. Since the social norms governing whether students are expected to work and at what age older workers are expected to retire, there is a case to be made that a particularly heavy weight ought to be given to the experience of prime age workers when comparing employment performance across countries. 
79.9%).
What is distinctive about the difference between France and the U.S. for prime-age workers is less the adequacy of employment opportunities than how those not employed are counted. 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 France U.S. Thus, the difference between French and U.S. labor markets for prime age workers is not to be found in the employment rates but in the labor force status of those not employed -a higher share of the non-employed in France report themselves as unemployed, while U.S. nonemployed prime age workers do not participate in the labor force (either more discouraged about job prospects or choose not to work). This is important because it directly challenges the conventional wisdom, at least for prime-age workers, that the source of high French unemployment is the shortage of job opportunities and work disincentives generated by over-regulation and welfare state generosity. Another complication for the conventional unemployment-based account of U.S. and
French performance concerns the magnitude of French youth unemployment, which is said to exemplify the failure of the French labor market to generate adequate job opportunities.
The unemployment-to-population rate (Upop) is almost never published, but it can be a particularly important indicator for understanding the magnitude of the youth unemployment problem. (generally part-time), compared to only 1.8 percent of these French teenagers. Among those enrolled in school, U.S. teenagers had a much higher unemployment-to-population rate (3.5 vs .8); for those not enrolled, the unemployment-to-population rate was about the same (2.4 for the U.S. and 2.1 for France).
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It might be argued that the extremely low employment rates (and high conventionally defined unemployment rates) for French teenagers were due to the lack of job opportunities, but the data suggest otherwise. In the early 1970s, when the French male youth unemployment rate was just 3-4 percent, about the same share of 16-19 year old students held jobs as in 2000-2 (less than 1%), when the standard unemployment rate was hovered around 22-23 percent (OECD, 2007, 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 French female youth U.S. female youth 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
The Measurement of Underutilization and Job Quality
Recognizing the limitations of the official unemployment and employment rates, statistical agencies and advocacy groups in many countries have developed a variety of alternative employment-related indicators. By far the most common are broader measures of underutilization, which take into account those who can only find part-time work ("involuntary part-time" workers) and those who have dropped out of the labor force because of poor job opportunities ("discouraged" workers).
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, for example, currently publishes six "alternative measures of unemployment and other forms of labor resource underutilization," ranging from the U-1, which shows "persons unemployed 15 weeks or longer" as a share of the labor force, to the U-6, the broadest published measure of underutilization, defined as "total unemployed persons, plus all 'marginally attached' workers, plus all persons employed part time for economic reasons" as a share of the labor force plus the marginally attached (Bregger and Haugen, 1995, p. 23) .
11 While these indicators of various dimensions of underutilization offer a broader picture labor market performance than the conventional unemployment rate, they do not measure the adequacy hours or pay.
There has been a growing interest in developing aggregate measures of "decent" work. The
Sixteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (1998) adopted a resolution "concerning the measurement of underemployment and inadequate employment situations" and called for indicators that reflect various dimensions of "time-related underemployment"
(willingness and availability to work additional hours) and inadequate employment ("skillrelated," "income-related" and "excessive hours related"). These recommendations left specific definitions and the generation of these indicators to the ILO and national statistical agencies.
Reflecting a growing concern with the quality of employment, the ILO launched the to appreciate the complex nature of the concept and therefore, also, the great difficulties in evolving viable and reliable statistical indicators for its measurement." The articles in this issue describe numerous indicators that reflect many important quantity-and quality-ofemployment dimensions, but they propose no single composite indicator (or small set of indicators) that would capture key quantity and quality dimensions of work, nor are they standardized in a way that would make them suitable for cross-country comparisons.
For example, Anker et al. (2003) identify thirty "existing, proposed, and readily usable indicators" that measure "employment opportunities; unacceptable work; adequate earnings and productive work; decent hours; stability and security of work; balancing work and family life; fair treatment in work; safe work environment; social protection; social dialogue and workplace relations; and the economic and social context of decent work" (Introduction, p. 110). However, no comprehensive indicator of "decent work" is presented. As the Introduction points out, problems of data availability for many of these 30 components of decent work "impose particularly severe limitations and are an obstacle to an immediate application…" (ibid., p. Table 9 ).
The indices developed by Ghai (2003) and Bonnet et al. (2003) are ambitious attempts to capture many dimensions of decent work, but the indices are provided for a single year and raise substantial questions about how each component should be weighted. Ghai presents results for 22 OECD countries base on equal weights are applied to four groups of indicators: gender disparities, employment, social dialogue, and social protection. Earnings from work are accounted for only by the gini coefficient in income (and in some cases, consumption), which is one of three measures that produce the "employment" component. Bonnet et al, (2003 conceptualize decent work in terms of "basic security for all", which they organize into "seven forms": labour market security, employment security, job security, work security, skill reproduction security, income security and representation security" (p. 214). They present results for 84 countries for a single year (early 2000s). As usual, Nordic countries do best, but there are curious results: Portugal does better than the UK, Japan and Australia; Slovakia bests the U.S.; and Barbados comes in higher than Switzerland (Figure 1 ).
More recently, the European Commission has defined employment quality in terms of 10 dimensions, ranging from "intrinsic job quality" to "overall economic performance and productivity". Interestingly, relative wages are not included as a "key indicator" in any of these groups (Davoine and Erhel (2006, p. 6) . In contrast, reflecting the results of their survey of the employment quality literature, Davoine and Erhel (2006, p. 9) this approach is that there is likely to be considerable disagreement over both what is "overqualified" and "dangerous" and to what extent these characteristics make the work "inadequate" (some workers may prefer work at jobs with higher than average injury rates). In order to facilitate cross-country comparisons and make them as simple and as noncontroversial as possible, we limit our measure of employment quality to low pay and inadequate hours of work.
New Employment Adequacy Indicators
The alternative indicators project (Howell, 2005b; Howell and Diallo, 2007) has aimed to develop simple aggregate measures of labor market performance that are similar in construction to conventional quantity-of-employment indicators (unemployment, labor force participation, and employment rates) but incorporate relatively easily measured and uncontroversial measures of employment quality.
The most obvious measure of employment quality is the level of wages. It is widely accepted that a very low wage identifies a "low quality" job. Several alternative "low wage" thresholds can be argued to be reasonable. We use a relative measure-two-thirds of the median hourly wage for all full-time workers-rather than a quasi-absolute one, such as the wage that would support a particular number of household members at a particular budget level. There are three main reasons for this. First, the household budget threshold is ultimately relative as well, since its determination depends on decisions about what is an "adequate" budget for a household of a particular size (say, a basic food budget multiplied by three), which in turn reflects prevailing social norms and a particular economic and social context. Second, our concern is to produce indicators for assessing labor market performance, not the adequacy of household income, so it is the social acceptability of the relative level of individual earnings that matters. And third, there are practical considerations: the adequacy of household income requires controversial adjustments for household size and composition, and a relative measure also greatly facilitates crosscountry comparisons. Our low-wage threshold (two thirds of the median full-time wage) is similar to that used by international research organizations like the OECD (it is also common to identify the "poverty wage" as one-half the median wage).
In addition, it also seems uncontroversial to characterize "time-related underemployment" as an indicator of poor labor market performance. The most common measure of this is "involuntary part-time employment" -workers who would prefer to work more hours but cannot due to inadequate employment opportunities. We assume that the greater the involuntary part-time share of jobs, the worse the labor market performance.
We do not explicitly account for discouraged workers for two reasons. First, it appears to be poorly measured in the U.S. and, in any case, the official numbers are very small (see Howell, 2005b ). In addition, there are concerns about comparability across countries. 12 It is also the case that the AER indirectly captures discouraged workers. While efforts to include other dimensions of inadequate employment, like employer provided health benefits (see Schmitt, 2008) or job precariousness and physical working conditions, are important and may be adequately measured in a single country, cross-country comparisons of these kinds of job characteristics are both extremely difficult and controversial (for a new ambitious effort, see Leschke et al, 2008) .
The new employment adequacy indicators are defined with reference to three different populations: total wage and salary employment 13 , the labor force, and the working age population. The low wage share of employment (LWS) measures the share of wage and salary employees paid low wages. The underemployment rate (UER) measures the share of the labor force that is unemployed, working involuntarily part-time, or paid low wages; and the adequate employment rate (AER) measures the share of the working age population employed in wage and salary jobs and not working involuntarily part-time or paid low wages.
The interpretation of the LWS and UER as measures of employment performance is straightforward and just like the unemployment rate: all else equal, performance is superior if the low wage share of employment and the underemployed share of the labor force is lower. But just as a higher employment rate is not necessarily a measure of better performance (Section 1), so a higher adequately employed share of the population does not necessarily indicate "better" performance. To take an extreme example, even if all employed workers are "adequately" employed, differences in social norms and the burden of tuition costs may affect employment rates for students, and therefore possibly the AER.
The same holds for older workers in countries with retirement set at relatively young ages, which will reduce employment rates, but reflects social choices and not necessarily the performance of the labor market. For these reasons, the AER may be most useful for assessing the experience of prime-age workers.
French and U.S. Employment Performance with the SCEPA Indicators
Data
The data used to generate the labor market indicators for the U.S. and France were generated from each country's basic household survey -the Current Population Survey for the U.S. and the Enquête Emploi for France. The U.S. indicators have been computed back to 1979 (see Howell and Diallo, 2007 and was held in March, except the years of the population census when it was held in January simultaneously with the census (e.g. 1999). Unlike our wage figure for the U.S., the French hourly wage is calculated by dividing monthly wages by monthly hours and is reported net of taxes.
14 The one fundamental difference between our measures and the official unemployment and employment rate measures is that we include only wage and salary workers. The selfemployed are excluded for both countries since our main quality measure, the hourly wage, is not available for them. The U.S. wage is pre-tax while the French wage is after-tax. Ideally, the wage measures would be identical, but this was not possible. At the same time, it is not clear what single wage measure (post-tax, post-transfer or pre-tax, pre-transfer) would be the most appropriate, given that the benefits received by French workers and their families from their taxes (health, education, retirement, unemployment benefits) tend to be provided, if at all, by employers in the U.S. and it is widely accepted that these are paid for by workers via lower wages. In any case, our objective is not to compare absolute living standards but to measure the share of jobs that pay a wage that is viewed within each country as socially acceptable. We assume that the use of these alternative wage measures do not have major effects for the relative standing of those in the bottom half of the wage distribution. 15 The self-employed shares of total employment for France and the U.S. and their trends over time are broadly similar. For France, the self-employed share fell steadily from 12.8% in 1990 to 8.9% in 2006 (INSEE) . For the U.S., this rate fell from 8.5% in 1990 to 7.5% in 2003 (Hipple, 2004, 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 source: authors' calculations from the CPS (see Howell and Diallo, 2007) Comparable wage trends for France are shown in Figure 6 As noted above, the interpretation of the Adequate Employment Rate (AER) as a measure of labor market performance may be somewhat different for young and prime-age workers, since it is not necessarily the case that a higher employment rate for students is better, even if the jobs qualify as "adequate." It is also the case that social choices lower substantially the employment rate for older workers (55-64) -for many French workers the "normal" (and legal) retirement age is 60. For these reasons, Figure 9 presents the AER results for U.S. and French men and women in two panels, the working age population (16-64) and the prime-age population (25-54). 
Results by Age, Gender and Educational Attainment
We have calculated these three indicators for male and female workers by education (less than high school, high school, some college, and college or more) and age (16-64, 25-54) for 1993-2005 . The next three sub-sections (one for each of the indicators) highlight some of the key findings (available on request). It should be noted that "employment" always refers to wage and salary workers (for reasons given above, the self-employed are not included).
The Low Wage Share of Employment (LWS)
Figure 10 The figure also shows that having a high school degree has large effects on the incidence of low wages for all groups except French men. For the total 16-64 population, the low-wage rate drops from 57.9 percent for U.S. men without a degree to 28.1 percent with a degree, and from, from 80.9 to 46.2 percent for U.S. women. Having the equivalent of a high school degree also makes a difference on average for French women: the LWS drops from 22.9 percent without to 14.5 percent with a degree. On the other hand, our results show that for French men, the rate is essentially identical for all workers (10.7 and 10.8 percent) and drops only modestly for prime-age workers (7.1 to 6.2%). The much higher French minimum wage and much greater collective bargaining coverage are the most likely reasons for the far lower incidence of low wages in France and for the much more modest differences in the low wage rate for those without and with a high school degree in France, particularly for men. school degree had low-wage rates (14-17%) that were about half that of U.S. women with some college (34-36%) and only slightly higher than U.S. women with at least a college degree (12-15%).
Unlike the U.S., low-wage rates are quite similar for French men and women, as well as for those with just some college and those with at least a college degree. For example, while low-wage rates for French prime-age men and women with some college in 2005 were 3.6 and 4.5 percent, comparable U.S. rates were 14 percent for men and 27.5 percent for women.
The Underemployed share of the Labor Force (UER)
Our underemployment rate results for France and the U.S. by gender and age group for 2005 are shown in Figure 11 . The UER is measured as the number of workers who are unemployed, low paid, or working involuntarily part-time as a share of the labor force. Figure 8 shows that on this measure of employment performance, the French labor market is also consistently superior, reflecting the fact that higher French unemployment is offset by a much lower incidence of low-wage employment in France. The largest French advantage was for those with less than a high school education (reflecting the effects of the high French minimum wage) and the smallest for men with a high school degree (since their wages are higher and less impacted by the legal minimum). Like the results for the low-wage share (figure 10), Figure 11 shows that a high school degree has little impact on the underemployment rate for French men (20.7% rather than 22.6%). For U.S. men the degree makes a much bigger difference for the UER: 34 percent with the degree versus 64 percent for those without it (dropping from about 64 to 34 percent (and 53 to 27% for prime-age U.S. men). French women with a high school degree had substantially higher underemployment rates in 2005 than their male counterparts (30.1% compared to 20.7%), but this was far below the U.S. female rate (50.7%) and even slightly below the U.S. male UER (33.8%). 
The Adequately Employed Share of the Population (AER)
As the share of the working age population employed with "adequate" jobs (not paid low wages and not working involuntarily part-time), a higher AER can be viewed as an indication of a better performing labor market. This is certainly a reasonable interpretation for prime-age workers but as noted above this is not necessarily so for youth and older workers. For this reason, we will focus on the results for prime-age workers. Figure 12 shows that for the two least educated groups (less than a high school degree and just a high school degree), the share of the working age population with adequate jobs was far higher in France than the U.S. in 2005 for both men and women. The left side of the figure shows that over 75 percent of prime-age French men without a degree had adequate jobs in 2005, compared to less than 38 percent for similar U.S. men. For primeage women without a degree, the French advantage was greater by a factor of four: 45.1 percent with adequate employment compared to only 11 percent for U.S. women. The right side of the figure shows that the gaps were also substantial for those with just a high school degree. * employed workers not paid low wages and not involuntarily part-time as a share of the working age population. Source: authors' calculations from national household surveys; see text.
Conclusion
This paper was motivated by the view that cross-country comparisons of labor market performance should be concerned with the quality as well as the quantity of jobs, and that such comparisons can be facilitated by more comprehensive indicators than are currently used. We compare French and U.S. labor market performance in recent decades with a variety of standard "quantity-of-employment" indicators (the unemployment-to-population and employment rate as well as the standard unemployment rate) as well as three alternative indicators designed to take into account the adequacy of hourly pay and hours of work: the low wage share of employment (LWS: employed at wages less than 2/3 of the full-time median), the underemployment rate (UER: unemployed, involuntary part-time, and low paid workers as a share of the labor force), and the adequate employment rate French students are employed, not that more are unemployed. Indeed, the U.S. has a much lower teenage unemployment rate but a higher unemployment-to-population rate.
At the same time, our alternative performance indicators that reflect the adequacy of work hours and hourly pay show much superior French performance. For example, the low wage share of employment was twice as high for U.S. men (about 24% vs. 12%) in the 1990s, and increased to 2.6 times 2006 as the French rate has fallen in recent years (to 9.2% in 2006). In 2005, the incidence of low wage employment for U.S. men with some college education was more than twice the rate for French men with less than a high school These results show far better labor market outcomes for less skilled French than U.S.
workers and underscore the importance of judging labor market performance with a variety of quantity-and quality-of-employment indicators. National labor market models should be designed to achieve the best possible overall employment performance, which calls for regulations, policies and social programs that promote adequate pay and hours of work as well as low unemployment. To help keep job quality at the top of the policy agenda, it would be a simple matter for statistical agencies to regularly publish, along with conventional unemployment and employment rates, employment adequacy indicators such as those presented in this paper.
